Intergovernmental Taxation - Recent Problems by Hynning, Clifford J.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 Article 1 
March 1937 
Intergovernmental Taxation - Recent Problems 
Clifford J. Hynning 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clifford J. Hynning, Intergovernmental Taxation - Recent Problems, 15 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 87 (1937). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol15/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 








W HEREVER several governmental authorities func-
tion within substantially the same area, a problem
inevitably arises as to the scope and manner in which
the official behavior of one is subject to the legal control
and regulation of others occupying the same or over-
lapping areas.' This problem has continuously become
more acute with the expansion of governmental activities,
especially where the shifting relationships in the balance
of power have steadily progressed in one particular di-
rection, as in the case of the recent activities of the Fed-
eral government in fields commonly believed to be re-
served to activities of other levels of government or of
private enterprise.2
In confining himself to the taxing aspects of these inter-
relationships, the writer seeks to show how competing
*Alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law; member of Illinois Bar.
' Metropolitan areas in the United States have given the most striking ex-
amples of this "chaos of area and rates [taxes]." In the Chicago area, for
example, there are at the present time 1621 units of government, including 204
cities, 15 counties, 165 townships, 978 school districts, 49 park districts, 4
forest preserve districts, 11 sanitary districts, 190 drainage districts, 4
mosquito abatement districts, and 1 health district. This enumeration is
adapted from Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky, The Government of the
Metropolitan Region of Chicago (University of Chicago Press, 1933).
2 See Stuart Chase, Government in Business (Henry Holt, 1935)
Schmeckiebier, The New Federal Organizations (Brookings, 1934); and
Marshall E. Dimock, Politics and Administration (1937).
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theories of constitutional law have led to far-flung exemp-
tions of private interests and behavior under the guise of
constitutional compulsion, hidden the costs of govern-
ment, and called for the intervention of remedial legis-
lation. Such legislation has been piecemeal in character,
and has been designed to meet the demands of special
pressure-groups.3 No attempt has been made to meet the
situation in a comprehensive manner.
Before undertaking to sketch the confusing maze of
cases,4 we may consider a few typical illustrations of the
way in which this age-old problem has re-emerged on the
national scene within the past few years.
When the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as the
duly constituted arm of the Federal government, acquires
vast holdings in bank stock, must it pay state and local
taxes thereon as a private owner would under like circum-
stances or may it claim governmental immunity? 5 When
the Public Works Administration constructs a housing
project and undertakes to sell plots to private persons by
long-term contracts reserving title until the purchase
price has been paid, will the local taxing authorities lose
the revenue that they would have received but for the fact
of Federal ownership! -When the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority acquires major portions of land within particular
counties for inundation by its navigation-power dams,
6
are such lands permanently withdrawn from the local tax
3 For illustrations of this type of legislation see table, footnote 56. In
some cases these special bills have been reported disapproved by the admin-
istration on the very ground of their piecemeal character, pending an over-all
determination of policy.
4 Classification of what is actually confused achieves little other than un-
reality. If the cases that are discussed in following sections do not fall
neatly into convenient patterns and categories, it may be the fault of the data
as well as of the analyst.
5 In Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209,
80 L. Ed. 586 (1936), the Supreme Court construed the statutory intention
that it should so pay, but under the urgings of the administration Congress
promptly amended the R. F. C. act to expressly deny that it had so intended.
74th Congress, Public No. 482.
6 It is frankly admitted by the T. V. A. that its power program as such,
without subordinate reference to navigation, has no constitutional leg upon
which to stand.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAXATION
rolls? When the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and
the Farm Credit Administration acquire vast tracts of
land formerly in private ownership, what shall be done
for the local units that are thereby deprived of consider-
able sources of revenue? Or when the land-purchase pro-
gram of the Resettlement Administration7 contemplates
the acquisition of almost ten million acres, what remedies
are afforded the local communities that may legally be
called upon to render additional social services-as school
and highway maintenance-to "relocated families," or
that have accumulated vast bonded debts demanding an-
nual interest payments and eventual liquidation ?
Juristically the modus vivendi of the Federal govern-
ment with respect to the state and local governments in
the field of taxation has been that of reciprocal immunity.
This principle has emerged in typical common-law fash-
ion, initially wavering between alternative theories of
governmental relations, and then eventually crystalizing
in its broadest form, with little conscious regard for the
far-flung economic implications which have only in mod-
ern times been forced upon public attention." Scattered
statutes have recognized the problem and provided for
various and conflicting types of ameliorating payments, 9
7 Although the Resettlement Administration was created and exists by
mere executive order, which may be rescinded or altered quite easily, its land
retirement program will probably be made permanent shortly.
8 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 76 L. Ed. 815 (1932), where he advocated the
frank overruling of previous precedents that were encloaking "vast private
incomes" from Federal and state taxation. At p. 405.
9 Weeks Forest Purchase Act of 1911 (Sec. 13); Taylor Grazing Act
(Sec. 11); TVA Act (Sec. 13; relates only to power production in two
states), among the federal laws have been noted. Many state laws include
provisions equalizing with local districts the problem of state land, as in
NEW YORK, Laws (1932) Ch. 61, sec. 4, at p. 2277 (forests) ; MASSACHUSETTS,
General Laws (1921) Ch. 58, § 13, 17; PENNSYLVANIA, Statutes with supple-
ment (1928), p. 451; WISCONSIN, Sec. 77.04-5; MINNESOTA, Session Laws
of 1933, Ch. 318, Secs. 1-2; MICHIGAN, General Laws, Secs. 3739-40, 3756,
5731, 5760; TEXAS, Revd. Civil Statutes, II, § 7150, at p. 2970; OKLAHOMA,
Comp. Statutes (1921) at p. 2227. Doubtless many other provisions exist.
Most of these provisions relate to forests or wastelands, and simply permit
some in lieu payment by the state to the appropriate local subdivision.
Generally, see Claude W. Stimson, "Exemption of Publicly Owned Property
from Taxation," 8 U. Cin. L. Rev. 32 (1934).
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but the vast bulk of the litigated cases remain within the
sphere of judicial precedents.
It is significant to note how the present American doc-
trine has arisen and persisted in direct opposition to
English and continental practice. In England the quasi-
governmental proprietary corporations, like the Port of
London Authority, are subject to the national income
tax."° Germany has a series of comprehensive statutes
permitting local and state (or Ldnder) taxation of the
proprietary functions of the Reich.1'
Under the persuasive influence of American constitu-
tional precedents, such as McCulloch v. Maryland2 and
Collector v. Day,13 Australia initially followed the doc-
trine of reciprocal immunity, but its High Court has
recently 14 disavowed the weight of its earlier decisions
and sanctioned local taxation of the income of federal
officers. This is also the law of Canada.
15
How then the American case? The answer is partly
historical, partly evolved from the theory of dual sover-
eignty, and partly practical. Like most problems of
American government, the attempts to solve the difficulty
were made primarily by the judiciary, although the prob-
lem itself was clearly not pre-eminently a justiciable one.
During the period from 1923 to 1927, the average annual contribution of
the Federal government to the twenty-eight states in which national forests
were located amounted to $10,250,000, which exceeded the actual cost of local
government in the same area ($9,750,000). See "A National Plan for Amer-
ican Forestry," 73rd Congress, 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 121, pp. 1106-09
(1933).
10 See Port of London Authority v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
[19201 2 K. B. 612.
11 See Hatschek, Die rechtliche Stellung des Fiscus. Note how the Ger-
man concept of "Fiscus" is much broader than our somewhat corresponding
"proprietary functions" developed in the field of municipal corporation law.
The Nazi Revolution has apparently not greatly affected this problem
although some of the regional reforms contemplated may radically alter these
relationships. See Lepawsky, "The Nazis Reform the Reich," American
Political Science Review, April, 1936, pp. 324-50.
12 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
13 11 Wall. 113,20 L. Ed. 122 (1871).
14 See Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd.,
28 C. L. R. (Austr.) 129. Note discussion of American precedents on pp.
168-71. This directly overruled Deakin v. Webb, 1 C. L. R. (Austr.) 585.
15 See Kennedy and Wells, Law of the Taxing Powers of Canada.
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It called for legislative and administrative action which
could weigh the factors of fiscal and functional rela-
tions."0 The doctrine arose first in a very practical case.
The Second United States Bank, never popular with the
masses, found itself the object of several discriminatory
state laws, which confronted it with the Hobson's choice
of surrendering the activities of its local branches to state
control or being taxed out of existence. The refusal of
the Baltimore branch to comply with such a statute raised
the issue before Chief Justice John Marshall,17 who first,
in that remarkably written opinion on the scope of the
power of the national government to do what was "nec-
essary and proper" to effect the nation's business, sus-
tained the congressional employment of a banking cor-
poration, and then passed on to condemn state interfer-
ence by tax or otherwise. His language was:
It is obvious that it [the power to tax] is an incident of sov-
ereignty, and is co-extensive with that to which it is an incident.
All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends,
are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend,
are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.
The result is a conviction that the states have no power, by
taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any man-
ner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of
that supremacy which the Constitution has declared....
On the other hand Marshall was careful to point out ex-
pressly that his opinion did not
deprive the states of any resources which they originally pos-
sessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of
the bank, in common with the other real property within the
state, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of
Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with other
property of the same description throughout the state.
16 See Harlan F. Stone, "The Common Law in the United States," 50
Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936) at p. 12, for general characterization of the rela-
tive roles of the judiciary, the legislature, and the administration in handling
the growing social needs.
17 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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What Marshall feared, and meant to condemn through the
constitutional processes, was the destructive interference
of state and local units with the activities of a budding
national republic.
To him, "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy."18 Self-preservation of national authority, for
which none was a better champion in word and deed than
the venerable Chief Justice, implied a constitutional im-
munity from state and local taxation. At the time it did
not involve a general immunity, nor can the language be
so construed. It was simply an immunity from discrimi-
natory taxation. Even as it was, McCulloch v. Maryland
met with a fiery reception from the public, and the na-
tional bank had to weather many cases and wrathful
revolt of local officialdom before it died so painfully un-
der the veto of President Jackson. 9
More than half a century passed before the states were
to present their claim of reciprocal immunity and to
achieve it.2° But in 1871, only shortly after the Civil war,
the Supreme Court enunciated a hitherto ignored parity
between the Federal and state governments, as far as
intergovernmental taxation was concerned. Constitu-
f -_--_-I P - _ .. 1-__ - - ....._ 1"'-^ 1 .1 - J. 71 T -Y..17 7 . _ AAr . .... 7 7 . 1,, A
iioiiai it (utrai,3 IIIII nplivu bllad IV UtUJtfU&Uv11 V. 1IfI Wti na&f U 11au
a natural corollary for the states: If the national author-
ity was exempt from state and local taxation, then, in all
18 Holmes pithily modified this to "not . . . while this court sits." Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 12 L. Ed. 857 (1928), at p. 223.
19 See McLaughlin, Constitutional History of the United States (1935),
pp. 388-94; and Warren, History of the United States Supreme Court, Ch. 6.
20 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869), which sustained
a national tax designed to drive state banks out of existence. As it could be
plausibly argued that such banks were as much state instrumentalities as the
national bank was a Federal instrumentality, why, if Collector v. Day were
sound, was not the national tax, which was admittedly discriminatory, invalid
on the same ground?
Compare some of the state cases arising under the attempt, in 1864, to
impose a national stamp duty on writs issuing out of state courts-almost
resurrected shades of royal tyranny. The duty was ordered set aside in the
following cases on the argument based on the reciprocal nature of govern-
mental immunity from taxation: Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864) ; Jones
v. Keep, 19 Wis. 390 (1865); and Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 504 (1867).
No Federal decision has been found; and in 1867 the national duty was
repealed.
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fairness, the state government, with its instrumentali-
ties and subdivisions, must likewise enjoy immunity from
Federal taxation. This was announced in the case of
Collector v. Day,2 where salaries of state officials were
held exempt from the current wartime income tax.22 In-
stead of reasserting Marshall's doctrine of national su-
premacy, the court stated that "the two governments are
upon an equality. 1121
These are the two leading cases from which have de-
veloped the tangled webs of constitutional exemption
from taxation. The earlier case was predicated upon a
national theory of government, the later upon a states'
right theory. The result was far-flung exemptions from
the taxing processes of vast amounts of economic wealth,
public and private.24
FEDERAL LAND EXEMPTED FROM STATE TAXATION
It is not without significance that when the United
States Supreme Court had the first occasion, as late as
1886,25 to examine the problem of the immunity from
state taxation of federally owned land, it apparently con-
sidered the issue debatable. The result was inevitable,
however, and the immunity was eventually declared. With
the multiplication of Federal agencies, stretching into
21 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1871). Bradley dissented, "I cannot but
regard it as founded on a fallacy, and that it will lead to mischievous con-
sequences." Students of the subject of tax-exempt securities have lamented
it particularly. The writer believes that a tolerable economic case for the
present practice of tax-exempt securities may be made, depending in part upon
whether ownership of such securities is concentrated or widespread. If the
latter, the controversy may be largely an accounting matter, for the exemp-
tion is clearly related to the amount of interest payable.
22 In Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022 (1842),
salaries of Federal officeholders were held immune.
23 For a view that this "equality" but furnishes a loophole for tax-dodgers
whereby the Federal government is deprived of large portions of its legitimate
revenue, see Louis B. Boudin, "Taxation of Governmental Instrumentali-
ties," 22 Geo. L. J. 1-40, 254-92 (1934).
24 Thomas Reed Powell, "Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Powers of the States," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 902, at pp. 929-31.
25 See Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 29 L. Ed. 845 (1886).
In Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 33 L. Ed. 687
(1890), the same rule was held applicable to any of the administrative sub
divisions of the state.
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corporate forms like the Emergency Fleet Corporation
or the Tennessee Valley Authority, the doctrine has been
correspondingly extended. But this process has not gone
on without noteworthy judicial complaint: "The immu-
nity of the sovereign from taxation would seem to belong
to the legal philosophy of the Middle Ages ... and to be
as unsuited to modern conditions as the immunity from
suit.... ,,2' Although the case might be one of hardship,
as another court candidly admitted, the relief therefrom
does not lie with the courts, but with the legislative
branch of government."
In the recent case of Mullen Benevolent Corporation v.
United States, 2 an interesting argument was presented
to get back of the simple syllogism leading from sover-
eignty to immunity. An Idaho statute providing for the
assessment of lands for local improvements and thus
giving any holder of bonds issued to advance such work
an enforceable lien on the land, directed the special gov-
ernmental unit, to reassess as many times as necessary, in
the event that one assessment proved insufficient to retire
the bonds. The local unit was not directly liable on the
bonds, nor were the landowners under any personal obli-
has been acquiring title to all the lands within the district
of the American Falls reservoir, by condemnation and
deed. Before the last land strips had been purchased it
became apparent that the previous assessments would
not suffice to retire the outstanding bonds. Action was
26 United States v. Hoboken, 29 F. (2d) 932 (1928), at p. 940.
27 For cases dealing with the extent of this immunity in cases of transfer
by the Federal government to private hands, see Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S.
219, 66 L. Ed. 573 (1922), holding land taxable although subject to govern-
ment lien for unpaid balance of purchase price; Lincoln County v. Pacific
Spruce Corp., 26 F. (2d) 435 (1928), holding land taxable where equitable
title had not been completely divested from the United States; New Bruns-
wick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, 72 L. Ed. 693 (1928), involving land
sold by the Emergency Housing Corporation.
28 290 U. S. 89, 78 L. Ed. 192 (1933), noted in 47 Harv. L. Rev. 706.
Cf. Lee v. Osceola & Little River Road Imp. Dist., 268 U. S. 643, 69 L. Ed.
1133 (1925), invalidating a state special tax imposed on land then owned
by private persons for benefits resulting from improvements made when the
title was in the Federal government.
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then instituted by a bondholder against the United States,
and it was contended that by these extensive land acquisi-
tions the government had been taking his property (that
is, the bonds), and impliedly promised to pay for it. The
Supreme Court dismissed his suit with the statement
(derived from some war cases29 ) that the program of
purchase and condemnation by the Federal government
amounted at most to a frustration of the power to reas-
sess, from which no promise on the part of the United
States could be implied.
FEDERAL AGENCY-INSTRUMENTALITY
The first type of Federal agency-instrumentality to
claim immunity was the national bank, whose claim was
upheld, under the specific ruling of McCulloch v. Marry-
land, except where Congress had specifically waived it,
which was quickly done in response to the demands of
local constituents. 0 But suppose the agency in question,
although performing Federal functions, owes its legal
authority through incorporation to the laws of the state
which seeks to impose the tax. At first impression, the
case for the affirmative power of the state would seem
clear, on ordinary principles of corporation law, for the
new entity comes into being only at the will of the power
29 Citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 67 L.
Ed. 773 (1923). Compare the limitation on this doctrine suggested by Inter-
national Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 75 L. Ed. 410 (1931).
30 See Queensboro National Bank v. Queensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 43 L. Ed.
850 (1899), for a discussion of the legal effects of such waiver. A distinction
has sometimes been taken between legal incidence and economic incidence
of the tax in question: If the former is involved, the tax is void; if the latter
is involved, the validity of the tax turns on the degree of interference with
the governmental agency. Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United
States, II, p. 150, citing as a type case of economic incidence Union Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. Ed. 787 (1873), where in sustaining
a state property tax upon a railroad incorporated by the Congress, the court
said, ". . . exemption of Federal agencies from state taxation is dependent
... upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power
to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the
efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such
necessary effect." Cf. Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 77 L. Ed. 925
(1933). It appears that types of the latter class are not very important, and
merge in fact with the type situations considered in subsequent sections of
this paper.
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imposing the tax. In a war-time case,31 however, where
the question first arose, Holmes pithily dismissed the
problem with the statement that "the incorporation and
formal erection of a new personality was for the con-
venience of the United States to carry out its ends."
However, the present applicability of this case has not
been considered very strong by public administrators.
The Comptroller General of the United States, for ex-
ample, has interposed fiscal objections, on this very
ground, to the employment by the "New Deal" (specifi-
cally the Public Works Administration's Division of
Housing) of corporate authorities created under state
law, regardless of the broader powers which the state
is able to bestow, as compared with Congress.
The primary factor in determining the validity of a
state tax imposed upon a private person or agency under
contract with the Federal government is the extent to
which the imposition of such a tax will interfere with and
unduly burden the performance of the service in ques-
tion.32 Obviously the scope and meaning of this doctrine
must be pricked out by the individual cases. Considerable
ingenuity is frequently needed by the courts to see dif-
ferences 1n cases apparently presenting substantially
identical factual relations, yet meeting with markedly dif-
ferent judical fate. For example, in Gillespie v. Okla-
homa,"3 the court (speaking through Holmes) held the
lessee of restricted Indian mineral lands, title to which
was in the United States, exempt from the general state
income tax, on the ground that in taxing the income de-
rived by the lessee from his share of oil and gas received
from the leased lands, the state was in effect taxing a
3' See Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 68 L. Ed. 328
(1923), involving the U. S. Spruce Production Corporation, incorporated un-
der the state laws of Washington, with ownership of all the stock in the
United States. This was distinctly a war-time case, for the purpose of the
corporation was to provide materials for the construction of airplanes.
32 See Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 56 L. Ed. 801
(1912), sustaining a tax upon machinery and tools used in the performance of
a contract with the United States.
33 257 U. S. 501, 66 L. Ed. 338 (1922). Brandeis vigorously dissented.
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Federal instrumejitality. When, almost a decade later,
the converse political relations obtained, that is, the Fed-
eral government sought to tax a lessee of land, title to
which was in the state, the tax was sustained in Group
Number One Oil Corporation v. Boss. 4 It seemed as if
the broad exemptions allowed in the Gillespie case were
narrowing. Then, in the following year, the wide-immu-
nity doctrine flowered again in Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Company,5 where the Federal tax was held in-
applicable to income derived from the lease of state lands
dedicated to the support of schools, by which lease part of
the proceeds from the oil and gas production was re-
served to the state for its public school fund. Vigorous
dissent was voiced by Brandeis, concurred in by Stone,
Cardozo, and Roberts:
Under the rule of Gillespie v. Oklahoma vast private incomes are
being given immunity from state and federal taxation . . . that
case was wrongly decided and should now be frankly overruled.
Merely to construe strictly its doctrine will not adequately pro-
tect the public revenues.3 6
In the recent case of Susquehanna Power Co. v. State
Tax Commission of Maryland,37 the ingenious argument
was advanced by a power company that, inasmuch as it
was operating under license issued by the Federal Power
Commission, it was ipso facto a Federal instrumentality
34 283 U. S. 279, 75 L. Ed. 1032 (1931).
35 285 U. S. 393, 76 L. Ed. 815 (1932).
36 It was in this dissent that Brandeis developed his famous rationale of
overruling unfortunate legal decisions, supplemented by his exhaustive listing
of previously overruled opinions.
Cf. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1926), where a con-
sulting engineer for the state was held subject to the federal income tax; in
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 75 L. Ed. 496 (1931) a person having a
contract to carry the mails was held subject to state tax; in Indian Motor-
cycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1277 (1931), the sale of
a motorcycle to the city for police functions was held exempt from the
Federal excise tax; in Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S.
466, 78 L. Ed. 918 (1934), an exemption from the state gas tax on products
used in connection with a construction contract made with the United States
was disallowed. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U. S. 242, 78 L.
Ed. 775 (1934).
37 283 U. S. 291, 75 L. Ed. 1042 (1931). This same argument had been
made, to be rejected, in several of the early cases upholding the constitution-
ality of state liquor laws.
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and consequently immune from state faxation. But the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone re-
jected the claim by insisting that the exemption rule
"must be given such a practical construction as will not
unduly impair the taxing power of the one [government]
or the appropriate exercise of its function by the other. "
88
The cases had long made a distinction between a privi-
lege or franchise granted by the government to a private
corporation in order to effect some governmental pur-
pose, and the property employed by the grantee of the
privilege solely for private business advantage. ' No
necessitous policy could operate to deprive the state of
jurisdiction to tax in this latter category, which was
obviously the case under consideration.
The principle of reciprocal immunity from intergov-
ernmental taxation has not been unqualifiedly accepted
by the courts. In the language of the cases, the principle
is usually stated without any equivocation, but one type
of limitation must be noted in some detail.
By reason of the very nature of a constitutional system
which undertakes to differentiate sharply the powers and
and functions of the state and Federal governments re-
spectively, the cases presenting claims for state immu-
nity have been far more variant and numerous than cor-
ollary assertions of Federal freedom from state and
local taxation. The theory of American federalism vests
in the states all the residual powers of government: they
can do anything not forbidden by either the Federal
Constitution or their own. On the other hand, the Federal
government is required to isolate one or a series of
" constitutional pegs" upon which to predicate its author-
ity in any given case.89 Although the Federal government
38 At p. 294. See Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291
U. S. 17, 78 L. Ed. 622 (1933), involving a license issued under U. S. Ware-
housing Act.
39 The "general welfare" clause of the United States Constitution (Art.
I, sec. 10) has not as yet been given an authoritative interpretation, although
it was noted with respect in the AAA decision in United States v. Butler,
297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936), to be passed by as "not necessary to
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has continually advanced the scope of its activities, with
but few reverses," the apparent magnitude of its opera-
tions is lessened by comparison with the activities of state
and local governments. For example, in 1932 the latest
date for which comparable financial statistics are avail-
able for the expenditures of all levels of government in
the United States,4 ' the expenditures of the Federal gov-
ernment accounted for only slightly more than one-fourth
of the aggregate. Conversely, the expenditures of the
states, counties, cities, and other local governments ac-
counted for 71 per cent of the total. It is thus apparent
that the problem of immunity in inter-governmental taxa-
tion is much more serious for the Federal government
than it is for the states and localities. And the courts
have on occasion been keenly aware of the vital signifi-
cance of this problem.
The typical judicial reaction in disposing of the more
difficult cases is to develop "distinctions" 42 which effec-
tively annul or restrict the application of otherwise
established principles to the specific situation, especially
where, under the changed social and economic conditions
of the time, a rigid application of principles might lead to
impractical results unforeseeable when the principles
were initially formulated.
The "distinction" so observed was one adapted and
elaborated from the law of municipal corporations where
decide." Theodore Roosevelt's attempt at a nationalistic interpretation of
the power of the Presidency to act whenever the states could not constitution-
ally or practicably act, where action was imperatively needed, met with poor
success in the Supreme Court. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. Ed.
956 (1907). At the time President-elect Taft, who later became supreme
court justice, joined with Roosevelt and Wn. Jennings Bryan at the Gover-
nors' Conference to deny the existence in American constitutionalism of any
"twilight zone" where neither federal nor state power could be exercised.
Such a theory, however, would in time probably destroy the basis of tradi-
tional federalism. See Corwin, Twilight of the Supreme Court (1935).
40 The restraining interpretation of the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the 14th Amendment is perhaps the clearest case in addition to the NRA
and AAA cases. See Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394
(1873).
41 U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Financial Statistics of State and Local
Governments for 1932."
42 Arnold, Symbols of Government (1935).
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it had similarly arisen to "escape difficulties, in order
that injustice may not result from the recognition of
technical defenses based on the governmental character
of such [governmental] corporations.'"" The items dis-
tinguished were "governmental" and "proprietary"
functions. The established principle of tax immunity,
like government immunity in tort, was restricted to the
strictly "governmental" functions, that is, the older and
securely recognized activities of government. But when
the political authority undertakes to extend its sphere
of official operation beyond the lines drawn by tradition
into competition with private enterprise, utilities, trad-
ing, etc., then, the cloak of sovereignty no longer protects
the state, which must then function as best it may in a
world of competition and strife. But the passing of
time-say a half a century or more-according to the
Supreme Court of the United States in its latest expres-
sion on the subject in Brush v. Commissioner of Internal
13aRevenue, may cause a municipal utility (such as water-
works, which is functionally the most important of all
municipal utilities) to be classified as governmental, for
the purpose of extending tax immunity. This decision,
• • _'1 _*_ .1 . .. . ... 1 . .. *_ -4. 4-1- ^ 4. - 1 4.
just anniouniced, is thus Clearly against te trend to re-
strict tax immunity and only serves again to cast doubt
on the validity of the general American doctrine. The
only comfort left is that Justices Cardozo and Stone in-
dicated that the decision, because of the faulty pleadings
of the government, left open "the need for revision of
the doctrine of implied immunities."
The first indication of this tendency to restrict the
43 Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. Ed. 937 (1923) at p. 192.
To gain "sovereignty" was the symbol causing all the difficulty. There is a
distinctly recognized trend toward extending the scope of official liability.
Theoretically the movement is "pluralistic." See Duguit, Law and the Modern
State (translation and preface by Laski).
43a Decided March 15, 1937, and reported in United States Law Week,
823. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said, "There prob-
ably is no topic of the law in respect of which the decisions of the state courts
are in greater conflict and confusion than that which deals with the differ-
entiation between governmental and corporate powers of municipal corpo-
rations."
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scope of the immunity announced in Collector v. Day
came in the case of South Carolina v. United States.44
Having forsaken regulation as an effective means of
liquor control, South Carolina entered into the field of
the direct dispensing of liquor in state owned and oper-
ated stores. When the Federal commissioner of internal
revenue attempted to collect a Federal excise tax levied
on these state operations, the state claimed immunity.
In the face of the disastrous consequences for the national
revenue that might ensue, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the theory that Collector v. Day had no
limitations. If the contention of South Carolina were
.correct, an expanding sphere of economic activities might
readily be removed from the domain of Federal taxation
through the colorable device of state operation. The doc-
trine of state sovereignty could not be carried so far.
Later decisions refused to identify with "governmental"
-tax immune-such new state activities as banking45 and
operation of utilities, such as transportation, power, and
light.46
The precise point of South Carolina v. United States
was presented anew for a less impassioned consideration
upon the return of legalized liquor and beer, 7 but the
Federal tax was nevertheless sustained. If the state
44 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. Ed. 261 (1905).
45 North Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848, (1929), dismissed for want of
jurisdiction in 280 U. S. 528, 74 L. Ed. 594 (1929).
46 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 55 L. Ed. 389 (1911), the
court said, at p. 172, "It is no part of the essential government functions of a
state to provide means of transportation, supply artificial light, power and
the like."
47 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 78 L. Ed. 1307 (1934). Cf. Helvering
v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 79 L. Ed. 291 (1934), where members of the board
of trustees of the Boston Elevated Ry. Co., operated by the City, were held
subject to the Federal income tax. The court said, ". . . one of these limita-
tions [on immunity of state instrumentalities from Federal taxation] is that
the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the Federal taxing power
by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from usual govern-
mental functions and to which, by reason of their nature, the Federal taxing
power would normally extend." Cf. Moiseiff v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 21 B. T. A. 515 (1930), where a bridge engineer of the Port of
New York Authority was held exempt from the Federal income tax. Federal
Treasury Regulations, 77, Art. 643, exempts from the national income tax
only those state employees engaged in "essential governmental functions."
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chooses to go into the business of buying and selling com-
modities, that is a matter for it to decide, and the Federal
Constitution usually interposes no objection to its com-
petency. By its entering "the market place, seeking cus-
tomers," however, the state "divests itself of its quasi-
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of the
trader, so far, at least, as the taxing power of the Federal
government is concerned. "48 In other words, the state
becomes depoliticalized, and assumes the legal status
of a private entrepreneur under like circumstances.
With these precedents established, the states have more
or less reconciled themselves to this type of limitation
upon the scope of their tax exemptions.4 9 But the ques-.
tion of what the limitation may mean in any given case
naturally remains open to administrative and judicial
determination. Since the distinction is in origin frankly
utilitarian or functional, its application must be deter-
mined in the light of the objective it attains. However, in
a period of the rapid growth of national and state activi-
ties, political functions do not lend themselves to neat
classifications. The result is the typical maze of conflict-
ing decisions. In addition, trouble may be caused by the
connotations with which these terms have already been
identified in other fields of law, as in tort or condemnation
procedure. The general purpose of the classifications of
"governmental" or "public" and "proprietary" or
"nonpublic" may be the same in all instances-the eva-
sion of technical difficulties arising out of the concept of
"sovereignty." But quite clearly the specific purpose
may vary considerably. For example, the objective to be
attained by determining what is a "public use" which
will validate the exercise of the powers of condemnation
is quite different from that to be attained by labeling
given situations as "governmental" or "proprietary"
for the purpose of ascertaining official tort liability. One
48 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, at p. 368.
49 See notes 44-46.
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involves the problem of determining whether or not the
reason for condemnation is sufficiently important to re-
quire the use of an extraordinary legal remedy to force
a sale of property. The other is concerned with the prob-
lem of the distribution of costs of accidents, whether it
should fall on particular individuals or on the community
as a whole.
In the field of inter-governmental taxation the problem
is whether governmental functions or activities should be
given preferential treatment by the fiscal systems in the
same way as established functions of government are
already or whether they should be placed on a parity with
private activities of a similar character. For example,
when the state undertakes to sell liquor through its state-
wide monopoly system, shall it enjoy the same immunity
from Federal taxation as other units of government (as
the highway department) ; or shall it pay the tax in the
same way as the private liquor stores? The specific eco-
nomic problem is thus different from that of the social
distribution of cost in tort cases. But, in both, the gen-
eral objective of the court is the same, namely to avoid
unjust consequences from the application of the estab-
lished legal categories by noting "distinctions." If this
utilitarian purpose of these "distinctions" were frankly
recognized to be functional in origin and design, then the
role of the judiciary would appear actually as legislative
and not judicial. In theory it is legislative only in a lim-
ited, remedial sense, that is, until legislation can ade-
quately provide for the problem. In the meantime justice
is done, or approximated.
In other words, these "distinctions" are employed, not
for the purpose of explanation, as the legalist may too
readily assume, but instead to accomplish just results de-
termined on non-legal grounds. Without the observance
of such "distinctions" traditional law easily may bar
desirable results. Thus, a given practical result will oc-
cur where the factual phenomenon may be classified
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under category A (for example, "governmental") and a
different one under B ("proprietary"). But the con-
tent of these categories is not determined by the names
they bear but by whether or not it is desirable to have the
given result. If the court wants the result of traditional
law, it labels the activity "governmental"; if it does not,
it calls the case "proprietary." Thus, the "distinction"
obviously is not an explanation, but a vicious circle for
stating results of something already determined. But
with the gradual accretion of precedents interpreting
these "distinctions" the original objective may be lost
sight of and the categories incorporated for all intents
and purposes into the body of law.
This distinction between "governmental" and "pro-
prietary" functions has been spoken of as a limita-
tion on the doctrine of reciprocal immunity because a cor-
responding distinction has not been made with reference
to the activities of the Federal government. Apparently
all the activities and functions of the Federal government
must fall into the category of "governmental."50 At first
glance, it might seem that such a distinction could not be
constitutionally applied to the Federal government's ac-
tivities, because by its nature the national government
must always derive its powers from those expressly or
impliedly granted, since it has no residuary source upon
which to draw. And some credence might be lent to this
point of view when examining the concrete instances
cited in the opening paragraphs of this paper. For ex-
ample, the Tennessee Valley Authority defends its con-
stitutional status by references to Federal powers over
navigation and conservation of natural resources, par-
ticularly when they can be used for war purposes. It is
theoretically not in the business of manufacturing and
50 Compare dicta of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. California, 297
U. S. 175, 80 L. Ed. 567 (1936), that the doctrine of the South Carolina
case may be equally applicable to the Federal and state governments; Massa-
chusetts Acts for 1936, Ch. 81, exemption of Federal property is limited to
that used "for essential governmental functions."
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distributing power,5 although as an incident to its regu-
lar activities (navigation and flood control by erecting
dams), it may manufacture power. Thus, having the
source of electric power quite incidentally, the Federal
government may manifestly sell that power for what it
will bring. But a closer analysis clearly indicates that
in so doing the government is assuming the economic
position of a trader disposing of property (electrical en-
ergy) just as much as South Carolina did in selling liquor.
The only difference is that constitutional theory permits
the state to engage directly in the business, whereas the
Federal government can do so only incidentally to other
functions.
If these distinctions of "governmental" and "pro-
prietary" have any objective content, which after all they
may not have, as already suggested, then they should be
applicable to the Federal government. If they are, on the
other hand, functional concepts through which the ju-
diciary may actually determine policy before legislation
has been formulated, the problem should clearly be ap-
proached as one of policy-the relative independence of
the national authority from the state and local interfer-
ence, fiscal or otherwise. It is not at all unreasonable to
suppose that Marshall's own doctrine of national su-
premacy again determines the matter. After all, the
court of ultimate resort is part and parcel of the agency
determining the extent of its own authority, and has
naturally favored its own growth.
The Supreme Court of the United States has been as impartial
an umpire in national-state disputes as one of the members of
two contending teams could be expected to be .... The states,
as members of the Federal system, have had to play against the
umpire as well as against the national government itself. The
combination has long been too much for them.
52
It is submitted that this is evident in the only case noted.
51 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 80 L. Ed.
688 (1936).
52 0. P. Field, "States versus Nation, and the Supreme Court," 28 Am.
Pol. Sc. Rev. 233-45 (1934).
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The state of Alabama attempted to apply its kilowatt tax
on the generation of electricity to the operations of the
United States at Muscle Shoals, where the dam and
power plant constructed during the war was producing
small and varying amounts of energy for sale to the Ala-
bama Power Company. The contention of the state of
Alabama was naturally put in terms of the distinction
between governmental and proprietary acts, that is, that
since the Federal government was actually in the busi-
ness of producing power, its activities as such were
"proprietary" and hence subject to state taxation. But
the Federal District Court, upon the application of the
Federal government, speedily enjoined the collection of
the tax as an unconstitutional imposition upon a Federal
instrumentality. The state of Alabama then applied to
the Court of Claims in which it based its contention on an
implied contract. After a hearing on demurrer, which
raised the legal sufficiency of the claim, the Court of
Claims dismissed the suit for lack of merit. The court,
in its opinion, said:
... where Congress has taken the action it was taken in the
exercise of a public function, and the things to be done and the
agencies erected in pursuance thereof were public acts and public
agencies and cannot by any refinement or nice distinctions be
treated as or converted into private agencies and thereby be sub-
jected to state taxation. This being true, it follows that any sales
made of property purchased or owned in connection with the
creation of said agencies or the proceeds of the operation thereof
were made in the performance of a public function, in the trans-
action of public business, and cannot by any illogical twist or the
use of a false face be made to appear as private business.
53
The judgment was reversed, on appeal to the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the case should have been dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, since jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims does not extend to cases. of contracts
implied in law.54 Thus, the opinion of the Federal district
judge stands as the only direct pronouncement on the
53 State of Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897 (1930), at p. 901.
54 Alabama v. United States, 282 U. S. 502, 75 L. Ed. 492 (1931).
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subject matter. However, the states and localities have
long accommodated themselves to its ruling as the law
of the land.
As the case law presently stands, there is an implied
constitutional prohibition of intergovernmental taxa-
tion. In language, cases generally treat this prohibition
as reciprocal-that is, as the Federal government is im-
mune from taxation by the states and localities, so the
states and localities are immune from Federal taxation.
But, as has been noted, this reciprocal immunity has not
been allowed to develop without some modification. This
modification typically took the form of a distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" state activi-
ties, confining the doctrine of tax immunity to the former
category. On the other hand, no such distinction has
been taken with reference to the activities of the Federal
government, all of which are treated as if they were
classified as "governmental."
Remedial adjustment by legislation is made difficult by
the fact that this doctrine, insofar as the states and lo-
calities are concerned, has crystalized into a constitu-
tional doctrine beyond the control of the Congress. Vari-
ous types of "in lieu" payments to the states and locali-
ties have been authorized by the Congress, but clearly it
can not legislate concerning the imposition of Federal
taxes on states and localities. It cannot, for example,
provide that state employees shall be subject to the Fed-
eral income tax in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as others similarly situated except for the fact of
official status. That is the doctrine of Collector v. Day,
re-enforced by Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Com-
pany."s Unless a Brandeisian philosophy for circumvent-
55 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759 (1895). One of the reefs on which the
national income tax went aground was the attempted taxation of income from
state and municipal bonds. The Sixteenth Amendment failed to convince the
courts that such income was not exempted by the general language, although
elementary rules of statutory construction make exemption from legislative
policy dependent upon specific phraseology. If the courts had wished to
correct the damage wrought by the Collector case, they certainly passed up
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ing past decisions may prevail upon the court, as is quite
unlikely, the only recourse of adjustment lies through
constitutional amendment.
Immediate legislative relief must thus be partial (af-
fecting only state taxation of Federal activities, and not
the converse) and inevitably at the expense of the na-
tional revenues. There may be a bare possibility of se-
curing reciprocal action by the forty-eight legislatures
by employing the following device: Enact a congressional
act permitting states and localities to tax all Federal ac-
tivities to their fullest capacity (aside from the problem
of discrimination), provided that such states and locali-
ties enact similar permission for the Federal government
to tax the state and its localities. This would be an-
alogous to the Federal grants-in-aid made contingent
upon corresponding state action. But since the taxes
primarily affected are income taxes which are found only
in a limited number of states, few practical results on a
nation-wide basis may be expected to emerge out of this
solution.
Piecemeal adjustment rather than the adoption of a
definitive Federal policy has so far been the response of
the "New Deal" administration. With the exception of
the case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, all
the legislation has been in the direction of limiting the
traditional immunity of the Federal government and ex-
tending the claims of the states and localities. Aside
from this general point of similarity, however, the legis-
lation is most diverse. 6 The two loan agencies providing
for urban and rural debtors have claimed tax immunity
from the states and localities in all respects except on the
realty that they may acquire in the course of their op-
erations.
The Public Works Administration secured authoriza-
tion, upon request of a state or political subdivision af-
a grand opportunity in Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 62 L. Ed. 1049
(1918), and Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1926).
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fected by its program of low-cost housing and slum clear-
ance,
to enter into an agreement for the payment by the United
States of sums in lieu of taxes,... based upon the cost of the
public or municipal services to be supplied for the benefit of such
projects or the persons residing on or occupying such premises,
but taking into consideration the benefits to be derived by such
State or subdivision .. from such project.
56a
In no case are such in-lieu payments to exceed 5 per cent
of the gross rental income of the project or the actual
amount of real-property taxes paid on the property in
question for the year just previous to its acquisition by
the Federal government.
The act authorizing the Resettlement Administration
5 7
to make tax adjustments with localities in which its re-
settlement projects (as distinguished from land retire-
ment projects) are situated is almost identical with the
PWA enactment, except that it contains no provision
limiting the total amount of such payments in terms of 5
per cent or the actual amount of past taxes. This pro-
vision was omitted at the express request of the adminis-
tration, which argued that discretionary authorization in
IMMUNE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE
56 AGENCY COMPLETE EXCEPT IN-LIEU-PAYMENTS CITATION
IMMUNITY REALTY LIMITED DISCRETIONARY
farm Credit U.S.C.A., Tit. 12,
Administration X § 931
Home Owners' U.S.C.A., Tit. 12,
Loan C T4t. 12,
Corporation X § 1463(c)
Reconstruction 74th Congress, 2d
Finance sess. no. 482
Corporation X
Resettlement 74th Congress, 2d
Administration X sess. no. 845
Public Works 74th Congress, 2d
Administration X sess. H.R. 10551
Tennessee
Valley U.S.C.A., Tit. 
16,
Authority X § 8
56a U.S.C.A. Tit. 40, § 432.
57 H. R. 10551.
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making adjusted payments in lieu of taxes was vastly
preferable, if not actually indispensable, in the case of re-
settlement projects because of their diverse character, 8
whereas all of the housing projects of PWA were in
large urban centers. This diversity only made the prob-
lem of arriving at satisfactory fiscal adjustments with
the local taxing authorities proportionately more com-
plicated. However, as was pointed out at the committee
hearings, this discretion may readily give way under the
inevitable pressure that local constituents and their rep-
resentatives will bring to bear.
The TVA situation remains as it was at the time of its
creation in 1933. It was then empowered to pay 5 per
cent of the gross proceeds from its sale of power to the
states of Alabama and Tennessee (Section 13), in lieu of
all other taxes. No mention was made of localities. Bills
have been introduced into the Congress giving the Au-
thority power to make fiscal adjustments with localities
particularly affected by its dam inundations, but so far
nothing has been done.
In the case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
specific legislation has been enacted by the Congress, at
the behest of the administration, for the express purpose
of correcting a Supreme Court decision which construed
the RFC.to be subject to local taxation on its bank bonds
acquired and held by it in the course of its regular fiscal
operations. This decision came as a considerable sur-
prise to the administration, but Congress quickly re-
sponded by declaring that, "notwithstanding any other
provision or law," all personal property (specifically
enumerated as shares of preferred stock, capital notes,
and debentures) heretofore or hereafter acquired by the
58 The land retirement activities of the Resettlement Administration were
not covered by these statutes, for sufficient studies had not been undertaken
upon which to formulate legislative recommendations to the 74th Congress
with the suggestion that perhaps some adjustment might be outlined to the
forthcoming Congress. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of House Com-
mittee and Ways and Means of 74th Congress on H. R. 12876 (Bankhead
Bill).
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RFC shall not be subject to any taxation, "whether now,
heretofore, or hereafter imposed," and "whether for a
past, present, or future taxing period."' It was au-
thoritatively stated at the hearings of the congressional
committee that the RFC might be subject to the payment
of approximately five million dollars annually, without
such assertion of tax immunity; and this would result in
immediately higher costs of loans, etc.
So run the present statutes. Involved in all these situa-
tions may be at least two elements that must be con-
sidered in arriving at some feasible scheme of adjust-
ment: (a) past costs of local government, and (b) current
(and perhaps future) costs of local government. All of
the present legislation has confined its attention to the
second element-current costs. There can probably be
no quarrel with the formula devised by PWA and modi-
fied by the Resettlement Administration: Contractual
payments, in lieu of taxes, to the localities, for the sup-
port of such additional governmental services as a com-
munity may find itself obligated to undertake upon the
advent of a Federal project, provided due allowance is
made for benefits directly and incidentally conferred up-
on the community by virtue of its selection as a site for a
Federal project (for example, the rise in land values).
The precise problem of determining what in any given in-
stance should be the amount of the adjusted payment is
left, of necessity, to the administrative processes. How-
ever, so far, nothing has been attempted in adjusting the
problem of accrued costs of government, or the existing
debt structure whose reduction and eventual liquidation
must be accomplished by the successive levying of taxes,
primarily on realty. The acquisition by the Federal gov-
ernment of major portions of the land within a given
community obviously operates to narrow the tax base
and may easily nullify any real attempt at liquidation.
There is little prospect for relief to these interests in view
See H. R. 7474 of the 73rd Congress, 2nd session.
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of past court and legislative precedents. When added to
this are the facts that many of these heavy debt struc-
tures represent watered or ill-advised obligations and
that tax delinquency is rampant, the likelihood of legisla-
tive relief may be dark indeed.
With the passing of time and the consequent increase
in Federal activities, a reversal in the judicial doctrine
of intergovernmental taxation becomes constantly more
difficult. That it can be done, Australia may bear wit-
ness.60 Whether it should be done may be another ques-
tion. It has already been indicated that any congres-
sional solution, without a constitutional amendment or a
reversal of Collector v. Day and its ensuing decisions, can
effect only a partial solution and one at the entire ex-
pense of the national revenues. Deplorable, too, is the
fact that the discussion of tax immunity only serves to
cloud clear thinking about the whole problem of taxation
by hiding or shifting governmental costs. The early doc-
trine of Marshall for a national supremacy, assuring free-
dom of the national authority from discriminatory fiscal
interference by the states and localities did not encounter
these' difficulties. But the ensuing constitutional tax de-
cisions have digressed far from Marshall's simple form-
ulation. Large in any future adjustment of the fiscal re-
lations of the Federal government with the states and
localities loom two elements now undergoing rapid
changes: (1) the method and sources of taxation; (2) the
larger problem of the general adjustment of state and
Federal relations, in consonance with which any solution
to the perplexing tax problem must be worked out.
60 See footnote 4.
